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I. Introduction 
The stagnation of Costa Rican agriculture in the latter part of the 1970s 
has become a subject of considerable concern. A leading Costa Rican 
economist, Eduardo Lizano, has documented this stagnation in his recent book, 
Agricultura y Desarrollo Economica which shows that the growth rate of value 
added in agriculture failed to average even one percent annually in the 
1973-77 period while the growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) averaged 
more than 5 percent per year over the same period ... !/ Furthermore, this growth 
rate for the agricultural sector is substantially below the 5-6 percent annual 
growth rate achieved in earlier periods, such as 1968-72, when agricultural 
growth was only slightly less than the growth rate of GDP. An important 
characteristic of this stagnation, as Lizano points out, is that it is not 
concentrated in one or two products but rather tends to be spread throughout 
the agricultural sector. 
In his search for the possible causes of this stagnation, Lizano proposes 
and then dismisses a variety of natural factors such as droughts, floods, 
1/ See Chapter II. 
* Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics at The Ohio State 
University and Professor of Economics at Syracuse University and Visiting 
Professor of Agricultural Economics at The Ohio State University, 
respectively. 
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diseases and insect infestations. He also examines the availability of land 
and labor resources and concludes that changes in these factors cannot explain 
the stagnation of agriculture. After a brief discussion of prices and 
markets, Lizana dismisses these factors as a main cause of the stagnation, and 
he also finds no causal relationship between agricultural production and cre-
dit from the national banking system. Lizana concludes that the causes of the 
stagnation cannot be identified without further study, but that research and 
extension together with improvements in managerial capacity should receive top 
priority in the search for a solution to agricultural stagnation. 
The purpose of the present paper is to examine the impact of price, 
exchange rate and credit policies on the aggregate performance of Costa Rican 
agriculture during the 1970s. It will be argued that Costa Rica, not unlike 
many other developing countries, has pursued price, exchange rate and credit 
policies which have adversely affected the performance of the agricultural 
sector. The failure of Lizano's study to find a role for prices is due to the 
failure to use "real" prices (that is, to adjust nominal prices for inflation) 
and the failure to compare domestic prices with international prices. 
Agricultural price policy in developing countries is often based on a compro-
mise between forces that argue for domestic self-sufficiency and hence high 
prices and those that argue for low prices to stimulate industrial processing 
of raw materials and to provide low cost food for urban, industrial workers. 
Such a compromise often tends to emphasize the level of nominal prices rather 
than real prices, and this becomes particularly serious in an inflationary 
setting where prices are adjusted with a lag. Moreover, domestic prices are 
rarely compared to international prices, and when such comparisons are made, 
the appropriateness of the exchange rate is seldom considered. Governr1ent 
• 
3 
credit poli.cies for thC' agricultural sector typically focus on preferential 
low interest rates and fail to recognize that credit is fungible and cannot 
easily be tied to particular activities. Moreoever, in an inflationary 
setting such interest rate policies discourage banks from maintaining the real 
volume of agricultural lending while providing substantial income transfers to 
a relatively few credit recipients. 
The analysis in the present paper focuses on the behavior during the 
1970s of twelve of Costa Rica's principal agricultural products: rice, corn, 
beans,. sorghum, coffee, bananas, cocoa, sugarcane, beef, milk, hogs and 
broilers. The following section relates the output performance for these 
products to their real (deflated) prices after discussing the various Costa 
Rican governmental institutions which control agricultural prices. The next 
section compares the prices of these products to international prices, that 
is, the prices of these products in the United States. International price 
comparisons are made at the official exchange rate and at a more appropriate 
exchange rate which takes into account the substantial over-valuation of the 
official rate. The next to the last section relates output to the real volume 
of bank credit for each of these products and then explains why the rela-
tionship between credit and output is so weak. Government interest rate 
policies, both before and after the financial reform of late 1978, are 
examined with respect to their implications for the allocation of credit to 
the agricultural sector. The final section summarizes the main conclusions of 
the analysis for government price and interest rate policies. 
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II. Production and Real Domestic Prices 
Basic Grains and Beans 
Two government institutions play a major role in determining prices of 
basic grains. The Consejo Nacional de Produccion (CNP), established in 1943, 
has considerable authority to intervene in the marketing of food products. 
According to the Organic Law which created the CNP, it has the responsibility 
to: promote agricultural and industrial production; stabilize prices of food 
and industrial raw materials; pursue a fair equilibrium between the interests 
o[ producers and .:onsumen;; and seek the f.mprovl'ment or 11.ving conditions of 
Costa Rican people ... ~/ Even though it has wide discretion with respect to the 
number and kind of agricultural products subject to its market intervention 
policies, the CNP has chosen to concentrate on those grains which represent a 
substantial proportion of the value of agricultural output (rice, beans, corn 
and sorghum) ... ~/ The key feature of CNP market intervention policies are the 
price support program which guarantees minimum purchase prices to farmers for 
these basic grains and the monopoly control which the CNP has over imports and 
exports which effectively protects the domestic market from the international 
market. To implement the price support program, the CNP has a series of 
purchasing agencies located in the main producing areas as well as storage and 
processing facilities. In addition to the CNP, the Ministerio de Economia, 
Industria y Commercio (MEIC) has an important role in controlling the retail 
2/ Organic Law of the Consejo Nacional de Produccion, Chapter I, 
Article 4. 
3/ The CNP also administers the state-owned monopoly of liquor manufac-
tured in Costa Rica, owns a network of retail sales outlets distributed 
throughout the country in which it sells staple goods to consumers, and deter-
mines the export quota for beef which will be discussed later in this section. 
prices for basic grains, the marketing margins for these products, and in 
coordinaLl.ng its price control policy with the CNl''s price support policy. 
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A level of prices high enough to stimulate production yet one which 
guarantees consumers an abundant, low-cost supply of food is usually the focus 
of much controversy in institutions which have price control responsibility 
such as the CNP and M~:rc. Pri.ce setting becomes a more complic:ated issue in 
an inflationary economy where the level of nominal or current prices may be 
quite different from "real" prices, that is, nominal prices adjusted for 
inflation by some deflator such as that for Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
Although the attention of policy makers is usually focused on nominal prices, 
these prices are useless as indicators of price incentives in an inflationary 
economy where a high nominal price may, after a time without adjustment, become 
a low real price which no longer provides any incentive to increase production. 
For these reasons, this section of the paper will analyze trends in production 
compared to the deflated farm price of the selected products. 
The production-consumption balance for the basic grains is such that Costa 
Rica is self sufficient in rice, which has even been exported in some recent 
years, and deficit in the others. Corn production is equal to approximately 
90 percent of consumption, while sorghum and bean production are sufficient 
for about half of the domestic consumption of these products. (Since Costa 
Rica does not produce wheat, it must import all the wheat for domestic 
consumption.) 
As can be seen in Table 1, even though the production of rice in Costa 
Rica is quite variable from year to year, it has increased significantly from 
')':i.6 thousand metric tons l.n lC)70 to 134.9 thousand metric tons in 1979 (an l8 
Table 1: Production and Prices of Basic Grains, 1970-1979 
C 0 M M 0 D I T Y 
R I C E C 0 R N B E A N S S 0 R 
Deflated Deflated Deflated 
Calender Produc- Farm I Produc- Farm / Produc- Farm I Produc-
Year ti on Price~ tion Pric~ ti on Price~ tion 
Metric Colones Metric Colones Metric Col ones Metric 
Tons per ton Tons per ton Tons per ton Tons 
1970 55,621 981 71, 294 452 12,024 1017 7,278 
1971 68,723 840 70, 073 488 8,925 1196 11,887 
1972 62,719 878 75,910 466 14,203 1148 13,806 
1973 81,640 896 65,476 458 11,031 1790 16,419 
1974 62,230 1095 60,519 593 13,750 1944 14,129 
1975 112,132 1060 67,767 659 14,625 2003 19,780 
1976 105,860 843 114. 010 511 16,212 1736 30,885 
1977 109, 964 761 84,703 399 14,059 1477 40,986 
1978 123,640 735 62,284 393 14, 010 1385 52,565 
1979E-1 134,907 685 67,657 396 8,639 1244 59,000 
~/Prices are deflated with the GDP deflater using a 1966 base year. 
E/Preliminary estimates. 
N.A. is data not available 
Source: Banco Central de Costa Rica. 
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II 
G H U M 
Deflated 
Farm I Price~ 
Col ones 
per ton 
389 
417 
425 
534 
542 
580 
597 
461 
431 
N.A. 
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percent annual rate of increase in production). This strong output perfor-
mance has been associated with a decrease in the deflated farm price of rice 
(nominal price divided by the GDP deflator) of 20-25 percent from the early 
1970s to the late 1970s. Even though real rice prices have decreased, produc-
tion has increased because of changes in technology and a highly subsidized 
crop insurance scheme. Yields have increased because of the introduction of 
improved varieties while the location of rice prodution has shifted from the 
Pacific North to the Pacific South which has a more favorable distribution of 
rainfall. A second factor contributing to increased rice production has been 
the introduction of a highly subsidized crop insurance scheme which primarily 
benefits rice producers. A recent study by Vargas et al. shows that the crop 
insurance program of the National Insurance Institute has incurred large defi-
cits throughout most of the 1970s as premiums paid were equal to slightly over 
20 percent of the damages paid for crop failures, and most of these damages 
were paid to a limited number (about 400) of rice producers ... ~/ 
Sorghum production has increased from about 9,000 metric tons in the 
early 1970s to over 50,000 tons in the late 1970s, an average annual rate of 
inc reaSl' of 30 percent, which is higher than that of any other grain. The 
deflated farm price for sorghum at the end of the 1970s was slightly higher 
than that at the beginning of the decade, but below the level which prevailed 
in the mid 1970s (Table 1). On the other hand, the stagnation of corn pro-
duction appears to be related to less favorable deflated farm prices even 
though nominal prices were increasing. In response to increasing deflated 
4/ See Vargas et al. [ 1979] , for a complete analysis of the crop 
insurance program and its impact on rice production. 
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farm prices, corn production increased during the mid 1970s and reached a peak 
of 114,000 metric tons in 1976, after which corn production declined while the 
deflated farm price was also declining. 
Bean production reached the lowest level of the decade in 1979, slightly 
over half the 16,212 metric tons produced in 1976. The large bean crop of 
1976 occurred just after the deflated farm price of beans reached a peak in 
1975 which was double the deflated farm price of beans in 1970. From 1975 to 
1979 the deflated farm price of beans declined by over 35 percent while pro-
duction declined slowly through 1978 and then decreased dramatically in 1979. 
One of the difficulties in analyzing bean price and production relationships 
is that data on bean production are quite unreliable because of the widely 
dispersed, small scale nature of the production system. In addition, some 
Costa Rican bean production may actually be illegal imports from neighboring 
countries such as Nicaragua, and these have decreased dramatically in 1979 
because of the political unrest in that country. 
Export Crops 
Domestic prices for the main export crops (coffee, bananas, cocoa and 
sugarcane) are determined by a combination of world market trends for these 
products and Costa Rican government policy which is carried out through 
various quasi-governmental organizations. The deflated farm price of coffee 
and coffee production fluctuated mildly from 1970 through 1975 (Table 2). 
Then coffee prices nearly tripled from 1975 to 1977 and production increased 
rapidly in 1977 and 1978. On the other hand, banana production reached peaks 
of more than 1.2 million metric tons in 1973 and 1975 and has declined 
somewhat to a little more than 1.1 million metric tons annually since that 
.. 9 
Table 2: Production and Prices of Export Crops, 1970-1979 
c 0 M M 0 D I T y 
C 0 F F E E B A N A N A S c 0 C 0 A 
Deflated Deflated 
Calendar 
Year Production 
Farma/ 
Price- Production 
Farm I Pric~ Production 
Metric Col ones Metric Colones Metric 
Tons per ton Tons per ton Tons 
1970 80,590 4423 958,689 403 4,174 
1971 87,715 3803 1,027,648 354 4,422 
1972 88, 792 3495 1,186,093 371 7,055 
1973 92,646 4192 1,289,401 330 5,618 
1974 91,238 4244 1,151,277 391 5,919 
1975 85,259 3437 1,220,690 458 6,609 
1976 81,784 5453 1,187,147 416 5,855 
1977 87,183 8987 1,124,691 380 7,694 
1978 96,034 7092 1,149,117 357 10,072 
1979p_I N.A. N.A. 1,114,494 N.A. 5,000 
~/Prices are deflated with the GDP deflator using a 1966 base year. 
l/Preliminary estimate. 
N.A. is data not available. 
Source: Banco Central de Costa Rica 
Deflated 
Farm I Pric~ 
Colones 
per ton 
3373 
2453 
2541 
4169 
5953 
4008 
5352 
8595 
6999 
N.A. 
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time. The deflated farm price of bananas reached a peak in 1975 and has 
declined by about 22 percent since that time which may explain the stagnation 
in banana production in the late 1970s. Cocoa production and deflated farm 
prices have varied widely during the 1970s; however, both production and 
prices began to increase in the mid 1970s. Deflated cocoa prices reached a 
record level in 1977 and cocoa production reached a record one year later in 
1978 which indicates that cocoa production has also responded to changes in 
deflated farm prices. 
Sugar output has increased from 159 thousand metric tons in the 1970-71 
harvest to almost 195 thousand metric tons in the 1978-79 harvest, which is 
an annual rate of increase in output of about 2.4 percent (Table 3).'J._/ This 
rate of growth in production has not kept pace with the strong demand for 
sugar in both the domestic market and the export market. As can be seen from 
Table 3, exports of sugar have decreased by approximately 14,000 metric tons 
and exports as a percent of production have decreased from slightly over half 
of production at the beginning of the decade to about 35 percent of production 
at the end of the decade. An i_mportant reason for this decline of sugar 
exports has been the rapid growth of domestic demand which increased from about 
43 kilograms per person in 1970 to nearly 60 kilograms per person in 1979. 
Based on these consumption figures, domestic demand has increased at an annual 
rate of about 4.2 percent or nearly double the annual rate of increase in 
production • .§./ 
5/ The actual rate of increase in output could be somewhat different 
because the production data may not have captured all the production on farms 
that is processed and sold as crude sugar rather than being sold to a sugar 
mill. 
6/ The extent to which Costa Rican consumers have substituted refined 
sugar for crude sugar may have biased upward the actual rate of increase in 
consumption. 
11 
Table 3: Production, Exports and Domestic Consumption of Sugar, 1970-71 to 1978-79 
Exports as 
Agricultural Sugar Sugar A Percent of Domestic 
Year~/ Production Exports Production Consumption 
- - - - - Metric Tons - - - - - Percent Kilos/capita 
1970-71 159,559 82,822 51.9 43.5 
1971-72 181,441 97' 715 53.9 46.2 
1972-73 176,208 84' 963 48.2 48.9 
1973-74 166,331 68,644 41.3 52.2 
1974-75 178,499 69,285 38.8 54.3 
1975-76 172 ,846 75,366 43.6 54.3 
1976-77 194,809 67,842 34.8 56.0 
1977-78 191,339 70,530 36.9 57.6 
1978-79 194,582 68,412 35.2 59.9 
~/The agricultural year is from October 1 to September 30. 
Source: Liga Agricola Industrial de la Cana de Azucar 
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Sugarcane price policy in Costa Rica consists of a completely adminis-
tered price system. The Liga de la Cana, a quasi-governmental organization, 
controls the marketing and prices of sugarcane production and processed 
products in Costa Rica. The Liga sets the prices which sugar mills must pay 
producers, assigns production quotas to each and directs the sale of sugar 
production to the domestic or export market according to projected demands. 
Prices for sugar at all levels in the marketing system are controlled by MEIC. 
As can be seen in Table 4, the deflated domestic wholesale price for unrefined 
sugar was below the deflated FOB (free on board) export price of unrefined 
sugar until 1977-78. The fact that the deflated domestic wholesale prices 
have exceeded the export price in the last two years may indicate that the 
government is attempting to improve prices to farmers in real terms by using 
higher domestic prices to offset the decline in world prices which continued 
through 1978-79. 
The lack of production incentives in the form of adequate prices appears 
to be one of the factors which explains the stagnation of sugar production. 
The deflated farm price for sugar in 1977-78 and 1978-79 was about equal to 
the deflated price for sugar in 1970-71 and 1971-72 (Table 4). However, the 
deflated farm price of sugar increased by over 50 percent from 1970-71 to 
1974-75 before falling to the level prevailing at the beginning of the decade. 
Sugar production also increased rapidly because of more favorable farm prices 
and worldwide prices for sugar in that period. 
Livestock Products 
Total slaughter of beef cattle has increased at the relatively slow rate 
of about 1 percent annually during the decade of the 1970s. As can be seen in 
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Table 4: A Comparison of Export, Wholesale and Farm Prices 
of Unrefined Sugar, 1970-71 to 1978-79 
Agricultural 
Year 
Def lated FOB Price 
of Unrefined Sugar 
Exported from I 
Costa Rican Port~ 
Deflated Wholesale 
Price of Unrefinedb/ 
Sugar in San Jose-
Deflated Farm 
Price Equivalent 
of Unrefinedc/ 
Sugar Price-
Colones per metric ton - - - - -
1970-71 877 894 433 
1971-72 998 841 441 
1972-73 1043 732 427 
1973-74 1639 594 556 
1974-75 3204 608 719 
1975-76 1267 591 479 
1976-77 839 617 468 
1977-78 649 725 460 
1978-79 355 762 437 
a/ 
- Converted to colones at the official exchange rate for each year and deflated 
with the GDP deflator using a 1966 base year. 
~/Prices are for the calender year 1970 through 1978 and are deflated with the 
GDP deflator using a 1966 base year. 
£/calculated from the average farm price paid for cane adjusted to reflect the 
average annual yield of sugar per ton of cane and deflated with the GDP de-
flator using a 1966 base year. 
Source: Liga Agricola Industrial de la Cana de Azucar. 
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Table 5, total slaughter from 1970 to 1973 averaged about 114,000 metric tons, 
it increased to a higher 125,000 metric ton level from 1974 to 1976 and then 
increased again to over 130,000 metric tons from 1977 to 1979. This total 
slaughter is divided between a domestic market which, as can be seen in Table 
5, has increased from 30 percent to 45 percent of total slaughter and an 
export market which has declined relatively and absolutely. Of the exported 
beef, over 95 percent is sold to the United States, most of it as frozen bone-
less beef. 
The main policy instruments used by by the Costa Rican government to 
intervene in the beef cattle market are export quotas and price controls. The 
CNP implements the export quota policy and the MEIC implements the price 
control policy. Because a higher price for beef exists in the export market 
than in the domestic market, an export quota has been devised to control the 
flow of cattle between these two markets. After obtaining an estimate of 
total slaughter based upon historical data and producer declarations of male 
cattle available for export, the CNP estimates domestic beef consumption needs 
and deducts this from total slaughter. The remainder is ·the amount available 
for export which is assigned as a quota to each export slaughter plant and 
heef producer • .Z./ The MEIC sets retail and wholesale price ceilings for beef 
which, in combination with the export quota, maintains lower beef prices in 
the domestic market than in the export market. 
The price trend for beef cattle in the domestic market and the export 
market, as well as the weighted average of the two markets for Costa Rican 
7/ See Stein for a thorough discussion of the beef export quota system 
in Costa Rica. 
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Table 5: Beef Cattle Production, Exports and Domestic Consumption, 1970-1979 
Domestic 
Calendar Total Slaughter Domestic Consumption 
Year No. of Head Quantity Exports Consumption As a Percent 
of Total 
Slaughter 
- metric tons - - - - - -
1970 280,043 111,037 77, 945 33,092 30% 
1971 291,567 116,090 68,918 47,172 41 
1972 301, 245 115,705 73,354 42,351 37 
1973 312,546 116,408 74,332 42,076 36 
1974 325,713 127,734 85,819 41,915 33 
1975 339,489 128,112 78,283 49,829 39 
1976 340,344 124,998 72,948 52,050 42 
1977 341,436 134,144 78,359 55,785 42 
1978 354, 963 145,959 82,636 63,323 43 
197¢1 340,365 137,120 75,580 61,540 45 
~/Preliminary estimates. 
N.A. is data not available. 
Source: Banco Central de Costa Rica 
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producers, reveals that the deflated price of beef cattle has decreased by 
approximately 25 percent in the decade of the 1970s. As can be seen in Table 
6, the export price is about 30 percent higher than the domestic price for 
beef cattle which suggests that government policy has an adverse impact on 
domestic prices to beef producers •. ~/ Although nominal prices have increased 
throughout the decade, deflated farm prices reached their peak in 1973 and 
have declined fairly steadily since that time. Such declining prices may 
explain the stagnation of beef cattle production. 
Hog production increased at an average annual rate of 4.6 percent in the 
1970s, being fairly stable from 1970 to 1975 and then increasing rapidly from 
1976 to 1978 (Table 7). The deflated price of hogs was also quite stable from 
1970 to 1975 and then declined by about 10 percent near the end of the decade. 
Even though pork production has increased at a relatively favorable rate, 
Costa Rica has had to import increasing amounts of pork to fill the gap 
between domestic demand and supply. Broiler production has increased fairly 
steadily at an annual rate of 3.5 percent during the 1970s (Table 7). This is 
quite a favorable performance when one considers that the deflated farm price 
of broilers decreased by about 10 percent from the beginning to the end of the 
decade. 
As can be seen in Table 7, milk production has increased from approxi-
mately 200 million liters in 1970 to slightly over 306 million liters in 1979, 
8/ In February, 1980, a new price policy which eliminated this price 
differential was approved by the Comision Reguladora de la Carne which con-
tains representatives of the beef cattle producers, processors and the 
government. 
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Table 6: Domestic and Export Prices of Beef, 1970-79 
Weighted 
Producer Price a/ Producer Price a/ Average Producer 
in Domestic Markets- In Export Market- Price in a/ 
Both Market~ 
Calendar Current Deflated Current Deflated Current Deflated 
Year Price Price.b./ Price Price.Q./ Price Price 
- - - - - Colones per metric ton live weight - -
1970 2540 2170 3013 2574 2733 2335 
1971 2650 2210 3048 2542 2823 2354 
1972 2850 2233 3733 2925 3272 2564 
1973 3910 2668 4688 3199 4249 2899 
1974 4190 2320 4330 2398 4258 2358 
1975 3806 1692 4785 2128 4337 1928 
1976 3869 14 7 ') 4984 1901 4509 1719 
1977 4043 1318 5327 1737 4794 1563 
1978 5270 1593 7046 2129 6276 1897 
197~/ 7080 1949 10463 2880 8945 2462 
a/ 
- The beef cattle price available in Costa Rica is that established at the 
Montecillos market - the principle beef cattle market in Costa Rica 
~/Prices are deflated with the GDP deflator using a 1966 base year. 
c/p l' . . 
- re 1m1nary estimates. 
Source: Banco Central de Costa Rica 
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Table 7: Production and Prices of Livestock Products, 1970-1979 
C 0 M M 0 D I T Y 
M I L K H 0 G S B R 0 I L E R S 
Calendar 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
197#1 
Production 
Thousand 
Liters 
206,093 
209,508 
221,979 
235,298 
240,916 
250,774 
271, 750 
290,299 
300,808 
306,524 
Deflated 
Farm I Pric~ Production 
Colones per 
000 liters 
804 
920 
905 
788 
908 
945 
864 
749 
778 
770 
Metric 
Tons 
9,447 
10,234 
10, 271 
10,415 
10,560 
9,619 
11,529 
12,509 
13' 710 
N.A. 
Deflated 
Farm I Pric~ Production 
Colones 
per ton 
2861 
3410 
3323 
3248 
3306 
3348 
3089 
3082 
3043 
N.A. 
Metric 
Tons 
4, 217 
4,411 
4,677 
4, 722 
4,900 
5,091 
5,415 
5,427 
5,590 
N.A. 
-~/Prices are deflated with the GDP deflator using a 1966 base year. 
E_/Preliminary estimates. 
N.A. is data not available. 
Source: Banco Central de Costa Rica 
Deflated 
Farm I Pric~ 
Colones 
per ton 
3186 
3052 
3589 
3295 
3688 
3255 
2898 
2834 
2593 
N.A. 
an average annual increase in production of about 4.8 percent.2./ This would 
seem to be an adequate growth rate of output, but it has slowed to only a 1.0 
percent annual growth rate in 1978 and 1979, which is much less than the 
growth rate of demand for dairy products, and this has necessitated increased 
imports. 
Price policy in the dairy industry consists of maximum selling prices for 
fluid milk administered by MEIC which are set below the market clearing price 
and are applied at all levels in the marketing channel from the producer to 
the consumer. The processors indicate that price controls such as those for 
fluid mllk result in an excess demand for the product and they must ration the 
limited supply among all consumers. Some of the ways which have been used to 
ration fluid milk consist of changing from daily delivery to homes or stores 
to an every other day delivery. In addition, processed milk products such as 
cheese, ice cream and yogurt do not have price controls so that processing 
plants may divert milk to those more profitable products, thereby further 
reducing the supply of fluid milk. 
The milk production increases have been achieved at the same time that 
the deflated farm price of milk has been decreasing. The deflated farm price, 
about 804 colones per thousand liters in 1970 has fluctuated substantially; it 
reached a high of 945 colones per thousand liters in 1975 and has tended to 
decrease since then to 770 colones per thousand liters in 1979. It is 
somewhat surprising that milk production has continued to increase during the 
9/ Since reliable estimates of raw milk production and consumption in 
rural areas are difficult to obtain, the annual rate of increase in production 
may be inflated because of the substitution over time of pasteurized milk for 
raw milk. 
last half of the decade in view of the declining price for the output; 
however, one would expect more of a lag in the production response to price 
changes for milk than for products with an annual production cycle. Because 
of declining prices, farmers may reduce milk output in the short run by tem-
porarily cutting back on the amount and quality of inputs such as the feed 
concentrates used for milk cows and the amount of urea and other fertilizers 
which they apply to their pastures. Conversations with milk producers indi-
cated that such reductions in the use of purchased inputs appear to have taken 
place in the Meseta Central and North during 1979. If prices continue low for 
long periods, producers will begin selling their milk cows for slaughter and 
diverting the pasture land to production of more profitable crops. The lack 
of current and reliable data on the dairy cow herd does not permit analysis of 
those numbers to observe whether dramatic changes in dairy cow numbers have 
occurred. 
III. International Price Comparisons 
When the prices of agricultural products in Costa Rica are compared with 
the prices of these same products in other countries, and these comparisons 
are made at the official exchange rate for the Costa Rican colon, Costa Rica 
appears to be non-competitive in the production of many agricultural products. 
However, using the official Costa Rican exchange rate for such comparisons is 
inappropriate and misleading. Using the offical exchange rate is not only 
likely to mislead government officials in setting price policies for the agri-
cultural sector, but also directly affects agricultural output through incen-
tives for producers. If, as is the case in Costa Rica, the official exchange 
rate is over-valued, then revenues received in domestic currency for export 
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sales are accordingly reduced, so that the incentives for producers to export, 
or Pven to produce those products which might be exported, are thereby 
reduced.l.Q/ 
There are two separate reasons for arguing that the Costa Rican colon is 
over-valued, and each of these must be taken into account independently in 
arriving at an estimate of the exchange rate which should be used in making 
international price comparisons. The first reason is based on traditional 
purchasing power parity arguments._!_!_/ In mid-1974 Costa Rica officially 
devalued by unifying its multiple exchange rates at the higher free market 
rate of 8.57 colones per U.S. dollar, and this fixed official rate was main-
tained throughout the rest of the 1970s. From mid-1974 to rnid-1979 the Costa 
Rican wholesale price index increased by 81 percent, while the wholesale price 
index in the United States, Costa Rica's major trading partner, increased by 
47 percent. Assuming that the official exchange rate adopted in rnid-1974 was 
an equil ihrium rate at that time and using the relative changes in wholesale 
prices in Costa Rica and the United States implies that the Costa Rican colon 
was over-valued by 23 percent as of mid-1979. It can further be argued that 
the mid-1974 devaluation was insufficient to remove completely the over-
valuation of the colon even at that time, as the large deficit in Costa Rica's 
balance of trade persisted after 1974. In fact, by the beginning of the 1980s 
this deficit had become so large that Costa Rica was forced to abandon its 
unified official exchange rate of 8.57 and in September, 1980, adopted a 
10/ See Schuh [1974] for an analysis of exchange rate policy and U.S. 
agriculture. 
11/ See Officer [1976] for a discussion of these arguments. 
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system under which half of most international transactions take place at the 
official rate and half at a free-market rate. By mid October the free-market 
rate exceeded 13 colones per U.S. dollar, which implies an over-valuation of 
more than 25 percent for the official exchange rate if the equilibrium rate is 
assumed to be half way between the official and free-market rates. 
To this estimate of the over-valuation of the official exchange rate, 
must be added an estimate of the over-valuation due to the structure of 
protection. It is now widely recognized that the protection of import-
competing activities through tariffs and other trade barriers implies negative 
protection for export activities, in part because the domestic currency is 
valued higher vis-a-vis foreign currencies than it otherwise would 
be.~/ Tariffs and other barriers against imports reduce the demand for 
foreign exchange and thereby raise the value of the domestic currency. 
Estimates of over-valuation due to the structure of protection are based on 
comparing the existing exchange rate with estimates of what the exchange rate 
would be under a regime of free trade. This depends, in turn, on estimates of 
the elasticities of demand for imports and of supply and demand for exports 
together with the rate of tax (or subsidy) on exports and the rate of nominal 
protection for imports (including both tariffs and other trade barriers)._!_'.!/ 
Estimates for Costa Rica based on data for 1978 yield an over-valuation of 
slightly more than 20 percent, and this figure is quite insensitive to 
12/ See Belassa and Associates [1971] for a full discussion of drt>dive 
protection and for estimates of effective protection for several developing 
countries including Brazil and Chile. 
13/ See Bacha and Taylor [1979]. 
~· 
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substantial changes in the elasticity estimates. However, it is likely to be 
an under-estimate of over-valuation for several reasons, primarily the dif-
ficulty of quantifying all non-tariff barriers against imports.~/ In 
addition, the changes in foreign exchange markets which were initiated in 
September, 1980, involve a substantial increase in nominal protection as many 
tariffs were increased and a system of prior deposits for imports was 
instituted. 
When the official exchange rate is used to compare farm level prices in 
Costa Rica with those in the United States, one set of conclusions is reached 
about the competitiveness and efficiency of Costa Rican agriculture, but the 
conclusions are strikingly different when the over-valuation of the exchange 
rate is taken into account. As shown in Table 8, the ratio of Costa Rican 
farm level prices to U.S. farm level prices at the official exchange rate 
suggests that Costa Rica is more efficient than the United States only for 
beef among the eight commodities examined. However, when a 40. percent over-
valuation of the official exchange rate is taken into account, (which is quite 
conservative given the foregoing estimates) Costa Rica is more efficient in 
five of the eight commodities: rice, milk, pork, and possibly beans, as well 
as beef. Such a dramatic change in the competitive position for these 
products indicates clearly that an over-valued exchange rate can introduce 
serious distortions in government price policies and can eliminate price 
incentives for producers of actual or potential exports. 
14/ The estimate of a 20 percent over-valuation in Costa Rica due to 
protection appears quite modest compared to the estimates of Belassa and 
Associates of 27 percent for Brazil and 68 percent for Chile as of the 
mid-1960s. 
Table 8: Comparison of Farm Prices in Costa Rica and the U.S. at the 
Official Exchange Rate and Adjusted for a 40 percent 
Over-Valuation of the Costa Rican Colon 
Average Ratio of Costa Rican Price 
Farm to U.S. Farm Prices at 
Price in Official Exchange Rate Commodity Costa Rica Exchange Rate Adjusted 40% 
Colones per 8.57 Colones 12.00 Colones 
Metric ton per U.S. $ oer U.S. $ 
Rough Rice 
1977 /78 1817 1.01 o. 72 
1978-79 1911 1.24 0.88 
Corn 
1977 /78 1630 2.37 1. 70 
1978/79 1783 2.39 1. 71 
Sorghum 
1977 /78 1405 2.27 1.63 
1978/79 1405 2.10 1. so 
Dry Edible Beans 
1977 /78 4891 1. 39 0.94 
1978/79 4891 1.32 0.99 
Beef 
1978 6276 0.68 0.49 
1979 8945 0.72 0.51 
Milk~_/ 
1978 2574 1.26 o. 90 
1979 2799 1.19 0.85 
Hogs 
1977 9450 1. 27 0.91 
1978 10070 1.14 0.82 
Broilers 
1977 8690 1. 95 1. 39 
1978 8579 1. 73 l. 23 
~/The price of milk is in Colones per thousand liters. 
Sources: Banco Central de Costa Rica and U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
F.SC.S. "A2ricultural Prices." 
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Since Costa Rican beef prices are about 70 percent of U.S. farm prices 
at the offfcial exchange rate and about 50 percent of U.S. farm prices when 
the over-valuation is considered, the Costa Rican beef industry should be in a 
strong competitive position in the export market. However, performance has 
not equalled this expectation. Because real (deflated) beef prices in Costa 
Rica have declined by about 25 percent during the 1970s, heef production has 
stagnated and beef exports have declined not only in absolute terms but also 
from 70 percent of total production to 55 percent. Stagnation resulting from 
low prices for producers is ultimately due to beef prices set low for Costa 
Rican consumers together with an over-valued exchange rate for beef exports. 
A more appropriate exchange rate could markedly increase producers revenues and 
thus provide the incentive necessary for increased beef output. 
Rice also appears to have strong potential as an export, but relatively 
little has actually been exported because the over-valued exchange rate 
misleads the government policy makers who set support prices and distorts 
price signals to domestic producers. As can be seen from Table 8, adjusting 
the official exchange rate for a 40 percent over-valuation makes Costa Rican 
farm level prices for rice about 20 percent lower than U.S. farm level prices. 
International price comparisons at an appropriate exchange rate thus indicate 
that Costa Rican rice producers are quite competitive, something which is not 
apparent when the official exchange rate is used. 
Distortion of price policies and incentives through an over-valued 
exchange rate can also be found in the Costa Rican dairy industry, even though 
the dairy industry is oriented toward the domestic market. It has frequently 
been argued that Costa Rica has a high cost, inefficient dairy industry which 
already receives too high a price for fluid milk. Evidence presented to 
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support this argument is that milk solids can be imported and reconstituted 
for sale as fluid milk in Costa Rica at a price competitive with locally 
produced milk. However, this argument ignores the fact that an over-valued 
exchange rate not only taxes the producers of export goods but also subsidizes 
the users of import goods. Because of the over-valued exchange rate, it 
appears more attractive to import milk solids than to raise domestic milk 
prices and thereby encourage domestic production. When the 40 percent over-
valuation of the official exchange rate is taken into account, Table 8 shows 
that Costa Rican farm level prices for milk are 10-15 percent below U.S. farm 
lPvel pric:es. The Costa IHc:;in dairy inclust:ry is thus not so inl'ffi•:iC'nt ;md 
high cost as has been argued, and higher domestic milk prices may be 
preferable to importing milk solids which are subsidized through an over-
valued official exchange rate. 
For some commodities, such as corn and sorghum, Costa Rican farm level 
prices remain substantially above U.S. farm level prices even when the over-
valuation of the official exchange rate is taken into account, which confirms 
that Costa Rica is not competitive in these products. In the case of beans, a 
40 percent adjustment of the official exchange rate yields Costa Rican farm 
level prices which are about the same as U.S. farm level prices. Wide price 
fluctuations and a failure to focus on technical problems of bean production, 
rather than the inefficiency of domestic producers may have been the principal 
handicaps for bean production. 
International price comparisons for hogs at an exchange rate adjusted for 
over-valuation indicate that Costa Rican farm level prices are quite com-
petitive with U.S. farm level prices, but broiler prices remain substantially 
higher in Costa Ric:a than in the' IJnited States. The mni.n harriPr t:o incrensed 
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production of pork, and especially hroilers, appears to be the high cost of 
feed grains which comprise a high percentage of the production costs for these 
products. Since the official exchange rate is over-valued, it might seem that 
pork and poultry producers benefit from a subsidy on imported feed grains. 
However, as discussed above, feed grain prices (e.g., corn and sorghum) remain 
high even when the exchange rate is adjusted for overvaluation. The CNP 
controls grain imports and thereby maintains the domestic prices of these 
inputs for pork and poultry substantially above world market levels. 
IV. Agricultural Credit 
The commerical banking system has traditionally been the predominant 
source of agricultural credit in Costa Rica, accounting for two-thirds to 
three-quarters of agricultural lending, with most of the rest spread among a 
variety of informal sources such as moneylenders and friends and 
relatives.!2/ No comprehensive survey has been carried out during the 1970s, 
but it is likely that the commerical banks have maintained their share of 
agricultural lending, while the growth of financieras (quasi-banks which avoid 
most government banking regulations) and agricultural suppliers has eroded the 
shares of other informal sources of credit. The Costa Rican banking system 
consist~ of a Central Bank and four commercial banks, all of which are owned 
hy tlw government of Costa Rica, but which operate with some autonomy, espe-
c i .1 I ly the commercLa l hanks. The me.st important at tributes of commerical hank 
;1gric11lt1trill lending in Costa Rh·a, ilt least until the financial reform of 
late 1978, have been the low interest rates set by the Central Bank and the 
15/ See Vogel and Gonzalez-Vega [1969]. 
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limits (both minimum and maximum) which the Central Bank sets on the amount of 
credit to be made available for different activities. 
Throughout most of the 1970s, interest rates on bank agricultural loans 
have been set between 8 and 11 percent, with the lowest rates on loans for 
small farmers and for certain preferred activities such as planting basic 
grains and oilseeds. The argument for these subsidized low interest rates, 
which have even been below the rate of inflation in Costa Rica during several 
years of the 1970s, is that they improve the distribution of income and pro-
mote agricultural production in the face of other distortions which place the 
agricultural sector, and especially small farmers, at a disadvantage.J:i/ With 
respect to the distribution of income, bank agricultural loans have been found 
to be highly concentrated in large loans to relatively wealthy farmers, a 
pattern unlikely to facilitate an improvement in income distribution.12./ As 
will be shown below, the relationship between subsidized credit and agri-
cultural production is also unclear, inspite of the Central Bank's limits on 
lending for different activities. This is due in part to two elements which 
weaken the Central Bank's system of credit limits: (1) the commercial banks 
are sometimes able to lend less than the minimum limit or more than the 
maximum; and (2) the limits apply to broadly-defined activities (e.g., 
planting seasonal crops) and not to specific activities (e.g., planting corn). 
However, the most important reason is borrower behavior, that is, even loans 
that are said to be for the planting of corn do not necessarily lead to more 
corn being planted. 
16/ See Liza no, [ 1980] Chapter IV. 
17/ See Vogel, (1977]. 
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Tahlc 9 shows for each of the principal crops the amount of credit dis-
burst>d hy the commer<: ia l hanks for each year, 1970 through 1978, and the per-
centage of total bank agricultural credit accounted for by each crop. In 
addition, bank agriculture credit is shown as a percentage of total bank 
credit and in real terms (using the deflator for gross domestic product). 
Data for 1979 are not shown, in part because the breakdown by crop is not yet 
available, but especially because the year since the financial reform of late 
1978 deserves separate attention. Although the agricultural sector may be 
favored with subsidized low interest rates, it is not cle;ir that the agri-
cultural sector has been favored with abundant credit. Bank agricultural 
credit has not only tended to decline as a share.of total bank credit during 
the 1970s, but has even failed to keep pace with inflation during most years. 
If a principal purpose of government credit policy is to promote agricultural 
production, the volume of credit available is likely to be more important than 
subsidized low interest rates. 
It is also important to look for consistent relationships for individual 
crops between production and the amount of bank credit allocated. However, it 
must be recognized that any such relationship may be due as much to the demand 
for credit by producers as to Central Bank policies which attempt to allocate 
the supply of credit. Looking fJrst at the main export crops, it is difficult 
to find any consistent evidence of a close relationship between Costa Rican 
bank credit and production. For coffee, Costa Rica's most important export in 
most years, production has tended to rise somewhat during the 1970s in the 
face of a decline in hank credit in real terms and as a share of total agri-
cultural credit. Bananas, usually the second most important export, have 
never been allocated an appreciable amount of credit by Costa Rican banks. 
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Table 9: National Banking System 
Distribution By Product of Credit Disbursed for Agriculture, 1970-1978 
(Millions of Colones and Percents) 
: 
1 9 7 0 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 3 
Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent 
of of of of of of of of 
Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit 
1. Coffee 470.5 64.2 461.5 47.8 454.1 47.8 528.7 45.4 
2. Bananas 14.8 2.0 25.8 2.7 4.6 0.5 2.8 0.2 
3. Cacao 1.6 0.2 1. 5 0.2 1.0 0.1 2.0 0.2 
4. Sugar Cane 27.7 3.8 27.9 2.9 31.9 3.4 25.2 2.2 
5. Rice 23.8 3.2 39.8 4.1 43.l 4.5 43.8 3.8 
6. Corn 2.4 0.3 6.3 0.6 8.9 0.9 6.3 0.5 
7. Beans 1.8 0.2 1.8 0.2 1. 5 0.2 1. 2 0.1 
8. Sorghum 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.1 1.0 0.1 1.8 0.2 
9. Beef Cattle 163.4 22.3 268.0 27.8 267.2 28.1 428.5 36.8 
10. Dairy Cattle 11. 7 1.6 36.5 3.8 32.7 3.4 20.8 1.8 
11. Hogs 0.6 0.1 2.8 0.3 3.9 0.4 2.5 0.2 
12. Poultry 2.2 0.3 4.4 0.4 4.7 0.5 5.5 0.5 
13. Other 11.6 1.6 88.7 9.2 96.1 10.1 93.9 8.1 
14. Total 732.3 100 965.6 100 950.8 100 1,163.2 100 
15. Deflated 
Amount of 
Credit~/ 625.6 805.2 745.1 793.7 
16. Amount of 
Credit for 
Agriculture 
as a percent 
of all Bank 
Credit 49.9 45.6 I; 3. 0 44.7 
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Table 9: cont'd 
1 9 7 4 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8 
Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent 
of of of of of of of of of of 
Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit 
1. 649.9 42.5 591.1 32.5 582.7 30.2 348.3 16.7 411. 5 16.5 
2. 29.4 1. 9 1.0 0.0 7.1 0.3 15.9 0.7 6.2 0.2 
3. 2.1 0.1 7.8 0.4 8.8 0.4 8.6 0.4 6.8 0.3 
4. 43.4 2.8 102.8 5.7 37.0 1. 9 97.5 4.6 58.0 2.3 
5. 74.7 4.9 244.5 13.5 244.9 12.7 212.3 10.1 236.7 9.5 
6. 12.3 0.8 38.4 2.1 40.9 2.1 41.4 2.0 29.3 1.1 
7. 8.0 0.5 16.4 0.9 11.3 0.6 12.9 0.5 9.4 0.3 
8. 8.5 0.6 25.4 1.4 32.3 1. 7 38.5 1.5 48.7 1.9 
9. 475.8 31.1 390.1 21. 5 424.3 22.0 542.6 26.0 668.4 26.9 
10. 33.9 2.2 48.9 2.7 75.5 3.9 146.5 7.0 146.1 5.8 
• 11. 2.8 0.2 4.3 0.2 7.1 0.4 10.7 0.5 19.8 0.8 
12. 10.5 0.7 6.2 0.3 14.4 0.7 18.4 0.8 16.3 0.6 
13. 176.2 11. 5 333.4 18.4 435.4 22.6 565.6 27.3 827.1 33.3 
14. 1,527.5 100 1,816.7 100 1,924.6 100 2,068.6 100 2,486.2 100 
1.5. 845.9 807.8 734.0 674.6 751.4 
16 40.0 37.9 38.0 37.8 37.1 
~/The amount of credit is deflated with the GDP deflator using a 1966 base year. 
Source: Banco Central de Costa Rica. 
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Rank credit for cocoa rose to a substantially higher level beginning with 
1975, and production rose appreciably in 1977 and 1978. However, the increase 
in cocoa prices heginning in 1973, and especially in 1977 and 1978, may he 
more responsible for the increases in credit and production than any attempts 
by the Central Bank to allocate more credit to cocoa. Bank credit for sugar-
cane has been quite erratic, with especially large increases in 1975 and 1977, 
but these fluctuations do not appear closely related to fluctuations in 
production. 
For basic grains any relationship between credit and production would be 
especially interesting because of the number of programs that Costa Rica has 
had to promote the production of basic grains, including several credit 
programs. High prices for rice in 1974 and 1975 led to substantial increases 
in production and bank credit for rice in 1975 and 1976. Since then, rice 
production has continued at a high level, especially in 1978 and 1979, while 
bank credit for rice has fallen in real terms and as a share of total agri-
c11ltural credit. Corn production and credit both fluctuated somewhat during 
the early 1970s, but without any close association. However, in 1975 bank 
credit for corn rose to its highest level in real terms and as a share of 
total agricutural credit, while production continued at a low level. Corn 
production reached a peak in 1976 and has since settled back to its earlier 
level, while bank credit for corn has continued to be more important in the 
late 1970s than earlier in the decade. The pattern for bean production and 
credit is similar to corn. Bank credit increased sharply in 1974, while bean 
production remained below its 1972 level. Bean production reached its peak in 
1976, after bank credit for beans had begun to taper off. Only sorghum, of 
• 
the four basic grains, shows a pattern of increasing bank credit accompanied 
hy increasing production. 
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The relationship between meat production, especially beef, and favorable 
credit conditions (or favorable prices) is much more difficult to detect 
because increased credit may initially lead to less slaughter as producers 
huild their herds in anticipation of increased long-run profits. Bank credit 
for beef cattle tended to increase during the early 1970s, reaching a peak in 
1973 and 1974 in real terms and as a share of total agricultural credit, but 
fell sharply in 1975 and 1976, and then rebounded somewhat in 1977 and 1978. 
Beef production remained quite stable from 1970 through 1973, fluctuated 
around a higher level from 1974 through 1976, and then fluctuated around a 
still higher level from 1977 through 1979. Bank credit for hogs increased 
appreciably in 1971 and 1972 and then declined somewhat in the following two 
years, while hog production fluctuated with no clear trend from 1970 through 
1975. Only since 1975 has there been a steady upward trend in both production 
and bank credit for hogs. Broiler production has tended to increase quite 
steadily throughout the 1970s, while bank credit increased very modestly 
through 1973, then rose sharply, fell back and rose again in the subsequent 
three years, and finally remained fairly stable in 1977 and 1978. Milk pro-
duction has also risen at a fairly steady pace during the 1970s, while credit 
for dairy cattle has shown significant fluctuations. Bank credit increased 
greatly in 1971, fell back the next two years, and then returned to its former 
level in real terms and as a share of total agricultural credit over the 
following two years, before increasing sharply in 1976 and 1977 and falling 
hack again in 1978. 
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The examination of production and bank credit during the 1970s for most 
of Costa Rica's main agricultural products does not give the impression of any 
close association between credit and output. Given the impact of the 
government's price policies on agricultural production, there is little indi-
cation that bank credit at subsidized low interest rates has effectively 
either complemented these price policies or off set any distortions that may 
have been induced. Recent studies of rural financial markets which emphasize 
the fungibility of credit help to explain why this is so.~/ Because credit 
is fungible, preferential low interest rates for the agricultural sector will 
fail to redirect resources toward favored activities in the agricultural 
sector. Preferential low interest rates do not change the prices paid by 
farmers for inputs or received for output or the technologies available to 
them and hence leave unchanged the relative profitability of agricultural and 
non-agricultural activities as well as different activities within the agri-
cultural sector. 
Since credit provides general command over resources, it cannot easily be 
tied to the production of particular goods. Diversion of loans to other than 
the prescribed uses by farmers has been found to be widespread whenever audits 
of credit use have been carried out.11/ Even diligent and costly programs of 
credit supervision have failed to eliminate diversion and, in any case, are 
based on the dubious assumption that supervisors know better than farmers what 
farmers should be producing and how they should be producing it. 20/ More 
18/ See especially Von Pischke and Adams, [ 1980]. 
19/ Few of these studies have been puhl ished because they are typi<:ally 
c;irriPd out on a confidential basis by international lending institutions. 
20/ See Lipton, [1976] for a strong attack on credit supervision from a 
somewhat radical perspective. 
• 
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suhtle and pervasive than outright diversion is the case in which the farmer 
presents the lender with his most attractive undertaking, one which would be 
carried out even if a loan were not received, and then uses the additional 
resources obtained with the loan for some unspecified activity. Such behavior 
is Pspt•cially Likt>ly for relatively wealthy fannt>rs who, as mentioned above, 
obtain the lion's share of bank agricultural credit in Costa Rica and who most 
often have a variety of activities both inside and outside the agricultural 
sector. 
As indicated above, Costa Rica underwent a major financial reform in late 
1978, so that the pattern of credit allocation for 1979 deserves special 
attention, even though information on credit for individual crops is not yet 
available. The main element in this financial reform was a substantial 
i.ncrease in some intf'rest rates and a complete freeing of others from Central 
Bank control. Rowever, certain interest rates, especially for activities 
within the agricultural sector, have continued to be fixed at low levels. 
Small farmer loans continue to be made at 8 percent per year and short-term 
loans for seasonal crops at 10 percent, ~1ile certain livestock activities are 
financed at preferential rates, hut mostly ahove 10 percent. Interest rates 
on loans from the financiera sections of the commercial banks are uncontrolled 
and have ranged from 20 to 25 percent during 1979, while the rate on loans 
from the banks' commercial sections continues to be set by the Central Bank, 
but at a rate which v11ries according to the London inter-bank rate, and has 
f l11ctuated somewhat below 20 percent during 1979.~/ 
2I/ Costa Rican comnwrcial bilnks are divided into departments, among which 
the most important are the commercial and financiera sect ions. 
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The interest rates paid on time deposits also vary according to the 
London inter-bank rate and have ranged around 15 percent during 1979, while no 
interest is paid on demand deposits and the rate on savings deposits is fixed 
at 8 percent. As might be expected, time deposits grew rapidly during 1979 
relative to both demand deposits and savings deposits. Given the structure of 
Costa Rican commercial banks, this has implied more resources available to the 
financiera sections to be lent at higher uncontrolled rates compared to the 
resources available to the commercial sections to be lent at lower preferen-
tial rates (either fixed or flexible). This relative lack of resources for 
the commercial sections could, of course, have been offset by Central Bank 
lending or by borrowing from foreign sources. In fact, these sources were 
used heavily during 1979 as domestic credit from the Central Bank to the com-
merical banks more than tripled, while the Central Bank almost doubled the 
foreign resources channelled to the commercial hanks, and the commercial banks 
themselves increased their direct borrowing from foreign sources. The foreign 
resources helped to offset the large deficit in Costa Rica's balance of trade, 
but more significantly almost all of these resources went to finance Costa 
Rica's large government deficit, as commercial bank lending to the public 
sector almost tripled during 1979. 
The net result of the interest rate reform, together with the foreign 
borrowing and the government's deficit, was that commercial bank credit to the 
private sector increased very little even in nominal terms during 1979 and 
actually declined in real terms. Moreover, all of the increase was in high 
interest rate loans from the financiera sections, as loans outstanding from the 
commercial sections to the private sector were virtually the same at the end 
of 1979 as at the end of 1978. Agriculture fared somewhat worse than the rest 
t 
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of LIH• priv;1t.C' scc·lor. 
sector fell from 43.5 percent at the end of 1978 to 41.5 percent at the end of 
1979, while its share of new loans disbursed was 37.1 percent during 1978 and 
35.3 percent during 1979. Agriculture actually increased its share of credit 
from the commercial sections and maintained its share of credit from the 
financiera sections. However, agriculture has traditionally depended heavily 
on the commerical sections and only lightly on the financiera sections, so 
that the substantial decline of the commercial section relative to the finan-
ciera sections led to the overall decline in bank credit to the agricultural 
sector. 
lt is too soon to evalu<1te the impact of these changes on agricultural 
production because production figures for 1979 are still preliminary and 
figures on bank credit by crop are not yet available. However, the fact that 
the agricultural sector lost out relative to the rest of the private sector 
which in turn lost out to the public sector in credit from the banking system 
suggests some problems. The main problem for agriculture from the financial 
reform does not appear to be the higher interest rates, as the agricultural 
sector was able to maintain its share of credit from the financiera sections 
where allocation is largely based on borrower demand, but rather in the 
restriction of credit from the commercial sections which have traditionally 
heen the main sourre of agricultural credit. A more complete interest rate 
reform which allows higher interest rates on commerical section loans could 
help to resolve this rroblem. 
V. Conclusion 
1Costa Rican agricultural production has tended to stagnate during the 
I 
1970s, especially during tlte second half of the decade. Adverse government 
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price policies for the agricultural sector have contributed substantially to 
this stagnation. Although the prices of most agricultural products have risen 
in nominal terms during the 1970s, converting to real prices using the defla-
tor for gross domestic product reveals much lower relative prices for most 
agricultural products at the end of the decade than at the beginning or in 
mid-decade. Government price policies for the agricultural sector have either 
ignored the reality of inflation or have attempted to combat inflation through 
agricultural price controls, and these have been costly policies in terms of 
agricultural output foregone. 
The government may have been misled by making inappropriate international 
price comparisons based on the official exchange rate, comparisons which 
suggest that Costa Rican is an inefficient and noncompetitive producer for 
many of its main agricultural products. When the official exchange rate is 
adjusted for an over-valuation of at least 40 percent, Costa Rican producers 
are shown to be efficient and competitive in a variety of agricultural 
products which are not currently being exported or are even being imported. 
Thus, Costa Rica is not only foregoing agricultural output but is also w~sting 
foreign exchange at a time of large halance of trade deficits. Moreover, 
government credit policies of subsidized low interest rates on bank agri-
cultural loans have done little or nothing to offset the effects of adverse 
price policies. Because credit is fungible it cannot readily be tied to par-
ticular activities, and low interest rate loans do not change the relative 
profitability of different activities either inside or outside the agri-
cultural sector. The main result of recent government credit policies has 
been to reduce the flow of bank credit to the agricultural sector in real 
terms, thereby complementing government price policies in their discrimination 
against the agricultural S<'ctor. 
' ,... 
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